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Background: Research on cognition in apathy has largely focused on executive functions. To the best of our
knowledge, no studies have investigated the relationship between apathy symptoms and processes involved in
social cognition. Apathy symptoms include attenuated emotional behaviour, low social engagement and social
withdrawal, all of which may be linked to underlying socio-cognitive deficits.
Methods: We compared patients with brain damage who also had apathy symptoms against similar patients with
brain damage but without apathy symptoms. Both patient groups were also compared against normal controls on
key socio-cognitive measures involving moral reasoning, social awareness related to making judgements between
normative and non-normative behaviour, Theory of Mind processing, and the perception of facial expressions of
emotion. We also controlled for the likely effects of executive deficits and depressive symptoms on these
comparisons.
Results: Our results indicated that patients with apathy were distinctively impaired in making moral reasoning
decisions and in judging the social appropriateness of behaviour. Deficits in Theory of Mind and perception of facial
expressions of emotion did not distinguish patients with apathy from those without apathy.
Conclusion: Our findings point to a possible socio-cognitive profile for apathy symptoms and provide initial
insights into how socio-cognitive deficits in patients with apathy may affect social functioning.
Keywords: Apathy, Brain damage, Social cognition, Theory of mind, Emotion perception, Social awareness,
Moral reasoningBackground
Over the past decade clinical observations and research
have helped establish the position of apathy or lack of
motivated activity as a common neuropsychiatric dis-
order following acquired brain damage, with important
predictive relations to rehabilitation success [1-3]. Studies
in the area have investigated the prevalence of apathy in
various neuropsychiatric populations [4], its relationship
with other disorders such as depression [5-8], and its asso-
ciation with executive processes involved in the cognitive
control of goal-directed activity [9-14]. To the best of our
knowledge no studies have investigated how apathy symp-
toms may relate to deficits in socio-cognitive domains
such as social decision making related to moral reasoning
and social awareness, Theory of Mind (ToM) judgements,* Correspondence: Progress.Njomboro@uct.ac.za
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oror the perception of facial expressions of emotion. The ab-
sence of studies in this area is striking when considered in
the context of the functional impairments that patients
with apathy show in their day-to-day lives. Behavioural
problems characterised by social withdrawal, disinterest in
social interactions, and deficits related to the experience
and expression of emotions, form a significant part of the
clinical picture in apathy [15-18].
Neurological models of motivated behaviour highlight
the role of distinct frontal-subcortical circuits in human
goal directed activity [11-13,19,20]. Damage to these
circuits is thought to underlie apathy symptoms [14,21],
and these symptoms have been reported in patients with
acquired brain damage involving both frontal and sub-
cortical lesions. For instance, in one meta-analytical
study [14] it was found that across five studies, an aver-
age of 61% of patients with focal frontal lesions and 41%
of patients with subcortical damage presented withtral Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Table 1 Patient characteristics and cause of brain injury
Etiology N Sex Age
M = Male Mean & Std Dev
F = Female
Cerebrovascular accident (CVA) 24 M = 15; F = 9 54.44 (12.29)
Head Injury 14 M = 11; F = 3 48.25 (15.27)
Anoxia 5 M = 5; F = 0 49.80 (11.05)
Herpes simplex encephalitis (HSE) 6 M = 5; F = 1 42.50 (8.60)
Total 49 M = 36; F = 13 48.75 (11.80)
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Apathy is also often associated with anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) lesions [24-26]. Large or bilateral frontal
and ACC lesions are known to cause even more severe
apathy [27,28]. Imaging studies have found a relationship
between apathy severity and bilateral atrophy of the med-
ial and orbital frontal cortices, the ACC, temporal cortex
and medial thalamic regions [18,29-32].
Damage to some of the frontal and subcortical brain
areas implicated in apathy is often closely associated
with social cognition deficits such as those involving
moral judgements, feelings of regret, empathy, and em-
barrassment [33-36]. In some neuropsychiatric samples,
functional and structural disruptions to neural mecha-
nisms sub-serving socio-cognitive processes are thought
to underlie significant behavioural aspects of brain path-
ology [37]. For example, impaired capacities to infer other
people’s beliefs and mental states have been reported in a
wide range of neuropsychiatric disorders, including autism
[38-40], frontal damage [41,42], schizophrenia [43-48],
various types of dementias [49-51], antisocial personality
disorder [52], and bipolar affective disorder [53]. It is likely
that these socio-cognitive deficits make it difficult for
patients to cope with and respond appropriately to their
social world, resulting in social withdrawal and loss of
interest in social life [38,54]. Such lack of interest and
social withdrawal are some of the defining features of
apathy [17,55].
Some evidence on the neural substrates of social cogni-
tion, particularly on the role of emotion processing and its
influences on human motivated behaviour has also been
forthcoming [56-61]. Most of these studies suggest the
involvement of subconscious emotional signals that help
initiate and pre-bias goal-directed social behaviour to-
wards adaptive choices [61-63]. It is possible that deficits
in the mechanisms that generate these signals may under-
lie apathy related socio-cognitive dysfunction. The ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex is thought to play a crucial role in
generating these signals [57], and has also been implicated
in apathy [64]. Furthermore, patients with apathy show
distinct deficits in their ability to initiate or sustain goal
directed social interactions [13].
This study focuses on the relationship between apathy
symptoms and social cognition. We hypothesized that
patients with acquired brain damage who present with
apathy symptoms would also present with significant
impairments on a battery of socio-cognitive tasks designed
to assess moral reasoning, social awareness, ToM, and
emotion perception when compared to similar patients
without apathy symptoms and also to neurologically
intact participants. Our aim was to take patients with
brain damage from a wide range of aetiologies in order
to give a broad sample of possible relations between ap-
athy and socio-cognitive processes. Measures of executivefunctioning and depressive symptoms were also taken
in order to separate the possible effects of executive def-
icits and depression on social cognition from those of
apathy symptoms. The literature suggests that executive
deficits and depressive symptoms are associated with
both apathy and some aspects of social cognition dys-
function [10,11,65]. We included 3 executive measures
in order to accommodate cognitive deficits across patients.
For instance, administering the Stroop test only would
have meant dropping patients with language problems.
In doing this we tried to obtain at least one executive
function score for each of the participants. We however
did not take these separate scores as interchangeable.
We treated each of the executive function scores as a
distinct covariate in our analyses.
Methods
Participants
Patients with brain damage were recruited from clinics
and rehabilitation centres within the West Midlands
region of England. All the patients were assessed at least
6 months post injury. In total 49 patients with neuro-
logical damage (see Table 1) and 56 neurologically intact
adult controls participated in the study. Imaging results
and lesion location data were available in 46 patients
(see Table 2). Control participants were recruited from
within the same area as patients through local adverts and
were screened for neurological and psychiatric illnesses.
Different controls took part on different tests. Table 3
gives the demographic characteristics of all participants
(including controls) across the individual tests. All partici-
pants gave informed written consent. Ethics approval for
the study was granted by the Birmingham and Solihull
Research Ethics Committee.
Materials and procedure
Apathy and depressive symptom measures
The informant-rated Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES-I;
[66]) was used to assess levels of apathy. The AES is the
most widely used apathy scale in both research and clin-
ical practice [67], and one of the few apathy scales with
validated psychometric properties [66]. The scale is an
Table 2 Lesion location and apathy diagnosis
Lesion IAES - 41 score cut off
Apathy No apathy Total
Left parietal 3 2 5
Right parietal 2 2 4
Bilateral parietal 0 1 1
Left fronto-temporal 3 4 7
Right fronto-temporal 5 2 7
Bilateral fronto-temporal 14 8 22
Total (N) 27 19 46
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and cognitive aspects of apathy. Each item on the scale,
(e.g. s/he gets things done during the day) is rated on a
scale of 1 (Not at all) to 4 (A lot). For a fuller description
of this scale, its administration guidelines and psychomet-
ric properties see [66]. Patients’ caregivers provided the
ratings on the scale. A higher score on the scale indicates
more apathy. An AES-1 score of 41 and above was taken
as indicative of the presence of apathy, in line with the
supplementary scoring guidelines obtained from the scale’s
authors. The level and presence of depressive symptoms
were evaluated using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
[68]). We classified scores at or above the score of 11 as
indicative of the presence of depression.Table 3 Demographic characteristics of participants on
the Moral sense, Social awareness, Reality known, Reality
unknown, Ekman 60 and Emotion hexagon tests
Test Participant
type
Sex Age
M = Male Mean & Std
DevF = Female
Moral sense test AP = 15 M = 14; F = 1 52.83 (15.03)
N = 42 NA = 8 M = 7; F = 1 58.13 (13.43)
C = 19 M = 10; F = 9 43.74 (18.63)
Social awareness test AP = 13 M = 12; F = 1 53.46 (13.31)
N = 50 NA = 12 M = 7; F = 5 56.00 (13.98)
C = 25 M = 12; F = 13 42.28 (18.11)
Reality Known AP =11 M = 9; F = 2 53.30 (15.08)
N = 20 NA = 9 M = 8; F = 1 55.33 (14.37)
Reality Unknown AP = 9 M = 8; F = 1 51.67 (15.02)
N = 21 NA = 12 M = 10; F = 2 55.25 (14.67)
Ekman 60 Test AP = 21 M = 20; F = 1 58.91 (12.14)
N = 69 NA = 14 M = 9; F = 5 55.82 (15.29)
C = 34 M = 20; F = 14 51.48 (17.06)
Emotion Hexagon Test AP = 20 M = 19; F = 1 53.58 (15.89)
N = 60 NA = 13 M = 10; F = 3 57.8 (14.55)
C = 27 M = 15; F = 15 54.74 (17.89)
AP, Patients with Apathy; NA, Patients without Apathy; C, Healthy controls.Executive function tests
The Brixton test
The Brixton Spatial Anticipation test [69] provided a
measure of cognitive control for our patients. We chose
this test because of its limited semantic loading, and
also because research shows it is robust enough and
sensitive to a number of executive processes, including
set shifting and rule or feedback use in acquired brain
damage [69,70]. The test consists of a series of pages in
a booklet. Each page has the same basic design with ten
circles in two rows of five each, one of which is coloured
blue. The participants’ task is to detect patterns in the
sequence of the blue circle and then predict its position
on subsequent pages. Further executive function mea-
sures were also obtained on the Stroop [71] and Hayling
[69] tests.
The Stroop test
On the Stroop test participants name the colour of printed
colour-words as fast as they can. A successful performance
on the test requires the inhibition of the tendency to read
the colour-words.
The Hayling test
On the Hayling test participants are read incomplete
sentences that they should complete with a word that is
not related in any way to the incomplete sentence. Suc-
cessful performance on this test requires the inhibition
of a pre-potent tendency to complete sentences.
Social cognition tests
Moral sense test
The moral dilemma scenarios used to assess moral rea-
soning on the test were taken from the classical ‘trolley
dilemmas’ used to explore intuitions about the permis-
sibility of sacrificing the well-being of one person in
order to save many others [72]. Participants were asked
to rate on a 1–7 likert-type scale the moral permissibility
of either intentionally harming one person in order to save
many others (intended harm), or letting some foreseeable
harm happen to one person in order to save many more
(foreseen harm). The test consisted of 30 story vignettes
made up of 10 control items, 10 intentional harm items,
and 10 foreseeable harm items (see Additional file 1:
Box 1).
Social awareness test
Dewey [73]’s Social Awareness Test (SAT) was used to
assess participants’ judgements of appropriateness of be-
haviour. The SAT consists of 9 short stories describing
ordinary and unusual social interactions which partici-
pants have to judge by choosing (A) if they think the be-
haviour is “Fairly normal behaviour in that situation”,
(B) if they think the behaviour is “strange behaviour in
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eccentric behaviour in that situation” and (D) if they
think the behaviour described is “shocking behaviour in
that situation” (see Additional file 2: Box 2).
Theory of mind tests
Two ToM tests were used: the Reality Known and the
Reality Unknown tests. The tests comprised a series of
carefully constructed non-verbal belief reasoning videos
designed to control for deficits in memory, executive func-
tion and comprehension. See [74] for a full description of
the tests. For example, in the Reality-Unknown test, a man
placed an object in one of two identical boxes in full view
of another female actor but without the participant seeing
in which box the object was placed (participants did not
know the reality about which box contained the object).
The woman then left the room, and while away, the
male actor swapped the two boxes. Upon returning, the
woman pointed at one of the boxes. Locating the box
containing the object then required participants to infer
on the woman’s false belief about the two boxes and to
realize that the object was therefore in the box other
than the one the woman pointed at. This ensured partici-
pants’ attribution of false belief could not be disrupted by
their own knowledge of the correct answer. To correctly
infer the woman’s false belief, participants did not need
to inhibit their own self perspective. Deficits related to
inhibiting one’s self perspective are quite common in
patients with brain damage, and have been shown to
confound performance on false belief ToM tasks [75].
Inhibition control trials thus followed the same se-
quence as false belief trials, but instead of swapping the
boxes, the man performed a visible transfer of the object
from one box to the other in full view of the participant.
Other trials in the two tests controlled for memory capaci-
ties. Working memory control trials followed the same
sequence as false belief trials except that the woman in-
dicated one of the boxes before leaving the room. This
enabled the participant to infer the location of the ob-
ject. In this case, inferring the correct location of the
object did not require the attribution of a false belief,
but as in the false-belief trial, participants had to re-
member that the location of the object changes when
the boxes are swapped and had to maintain this informa-
tion until a response was requested. The tasks’ limited use
of verbal language also controlled for problems related
to semantic loading, which is a problem with most
story-based false belief ToM tasks [76]. In the Reality
Known test, the participants were aware of the location
of the object.
Emotion perception tests
The Ekman 60 and the Emotion Hexagon tests from the
Facial Expressions of Emotions Stimuli and Tests (FEEST)CD-ROM [77] were used to assess perception of facial ex-
pressions of emotion. Both tests assess perception of the
facial expressions of six basic emotional states of anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise. Pictures of
the emotional faces are presented on a computer screen.
On the Ekman 60 test each emotion is represented on
10 face images, giving a total of 60 images for the entire
test. The faces on the emotion hexagon test are computer-
manipulated and morphed such that each emotion is
presented in graded levels of difficulty and hence the
emotions are comparatively more difficult to recognise
than those on the Ekman 60 test. Each emotion is
mixed or blended with another which it is most likely
confused with, resulting in the following sequence of
mixes; happiness-surprise-fear-sadness-disgust-anger. For
example, the happiness-surprise continuum is morphed
such that happiness would be blended with surprise (in
ratios of 90% happiness with 10% surprise; 70% happiness
with 30% surprise; 50% happiness with 50% surprise; 30%
happiness with 70% surprise; 10% happiness with 90% sur-
prise). The ends of this sequence (anger and happiness)
join to form the emotion hexagon (see [77], for a detailed
description of how the emotion hexagon test stimulus was
made). The Emotion hexagon test has a total of 120 trials
split into 4 blocks. In both the Ekman 60 and the Emotion
hexagon tests, participants responded by using a mouse to
click on one of the 6 emotion words (Anger, Disgust, Fear,
Sadness, Surprise, and Happiness) presented at the bottom
of the screen.
Summary on tests
Table 3 gives the participant composition on each of the
tests used in this study. For a variety of reasons, ranging
from patient drop out from the study to individual pa-
tients’ specific neurocognitive impairments which made
them unsuitable for some tests, it was not possible to
assess all patients on every task. Normal participants
were not assessed for depression and apathy symptoms
because a history of psychiatric illness was part of our
exclusion criteria. Neither did we test normal partici-
pants for executive deficits because we didn’t have any
practical or theoretical reason to expect them to present
with these deficits.
Data analysis
Exploratory data analysis was done to test for normality
of distribution and equality of variance. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) tests for normality of distribution and
Levene’s test for equality of variance where performed
to ascertain whether data met assumptions for the use
of parametric tests. Non-parametric test equivalents were
performed on data that violated these assumptions. The
correlation coefficient (r) was used as a measure of ef-
fect size.
Table 4 Means and standard deviations for responses to
‘Intended harm’ and ‘Foreseen harm’ moral dilemmas of
the Moral sense test
Control (n = 17) Apathy (n = 7) No apathy (n = 7)
Harm Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Intended 2.14 0.94 4.63 1.52 2.91 1.23
Foreseen 3.06 0.85 4.63 1.30 3.82 1.41
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Apathy and depression
Twenty five patients (51%) met the criteria for the pres-
ence of apathy in the absence of depression. The mean
score for apathy in the group of patients with apathy
symptoms was 50.96 (SD = 9.64) and that for patients
without apathy was 37.5 (SD = 7.57). One patient (2%)
met the criteria for depression but not apathy. Two pa-
tients (4.1%) met the criteria for the presence of both
apathy and depression. As groups, the mean depression
score for patients with apathy was 11.96 (SD = 7.97) and
11.83 (SD = 4.73) for patients without apathy. Twenty one
patients (42.9%) did not have either apathy or depression.
Executive functions
Brixton test
Brixton scores for patients with apathy symptoms (M =
27.72, SE = 2.11) were not significantly different from
those of patients who had no significant apathy symp-
toms (M = 24.31, SE = 1.98; t (22) = 1.14, p > 0.05; which
represented a small sized effect, r = .27. In subsequent
analyses, we also included the Brixton score as a covariate
because this test has been shown to demonstrate sensitivity
to a variety of executive deficits, such as perseverative
behaviour and deficits in feedback use.
Hayling test
No significant differences were found between patients with
apathy (Mdn = 20) and those without apathy (Mdn = 11),
Z = 1.10, ns, r = 0.20 on Section 1 of the Hayling test. Also,
no significant difference were found between patients with
apathy (Mdn = 33) and those without apathy (Mdn = 12),
Z = .91, ns, r = .17 on Section 2 of the Hayling test.
Stroop test
Patients with apathy (Mdn = 97) did not significantly differ
from those without apathy on Section 1 of the stroop test
(Mdn = 95.5), Z = 0.552, ns, r = .12. T-test comparisons
on Section 2 of the stroop test also showed no signifi-
cant differences in performance between patients with
apathy (M = 50.13, SE = 8.74) and those without apathy
(M = 45.00, SE = 11.35; t (21) = .35, p > 0.05, which rep-
resented a small sized effect r = .08.
Social cognition
Moral sense test
We excluded from analysis all subjects whose responses
fell more than 2 standard deviations from the control
mean on more than 2 of the 10 control scenarios be-
cause we felt such participants did not understand the
stories. For this reason, data for 9 patients were excluded
from analysis. Data for 2 of the normal participants
were also excluded because they failed to complete the
test. Table 4 shows the means and standard deviationsfor the three participant groups on the MST foreseen
and intended harm dimensions.
Intended harm
A one way ANOVA showed that the 3 participant
groups differed on how they judged intentional harm
F(2, 28) = 11.55, p < 0.001. Tukey HSD post hoc tests
revealed that patients with apathy judged that intentionally
harming one person to save many more as more permis-
sible (Mean = 4.63) than healthy controls (Mean = 2.14,
p < 0.001), and patients without apathy (Mean = 2.91,
p < 0.05). There were no significant differences in judge-
ments between healthy controls and patients without
apathy (p > 0.05). Including Brixton scores as a covariate
while comparing patients with apathy and those without
apathy’s intentional harm scores showed no significant ef-
fects of the Brixton score on moral judgements, F(1,11) =
2.17, ns., and the differences in moral judgements between
the 2 patient groups also remained significant, F(1,11) =
7.69, p < 0.05. Including the BDI score as a covariate
showed a borderline effect of depression and moral judge-
ments (F(1, 11) = 5.35, p = 0.05) but the difference between
moral judgements in patients with apathy and those with-
out apathy remained significant (F(1, 11) = 11.23, p < 0.01).
Foreseen harm
Judgements on the foreseen harm dimension differed
across the 3 participant groups, F(2, 27) = 6.82, p < 0.01.
Post hoc Tukey HSD tests showed no differences on
judgements on the moral permissibility of allowing some
foreseen harm to happen to one person in order to save
others between patients with apathy (Mean = 4.90) and
those without apathy (Mean = 3.82, p > 0.05). There were
significant differences between healthy control participants
(Mean = 3.06) and patients with apathy (p < 0.01) but
no significant differences between healthy controls and
patients without apathy (p > 0.05). Including Brixton scores
as a covariate while comparing patients with apathy against
scores for those without apathy showed no effect of the
Brixton score on moral judgements (F(1,11) = 2.91, ns)
though the differences in moral judgements between
patients with apathy and those without apathy became
borderline significant (F(1,11) = 4.27, p < .01). There
was no significant effect of the BDI score on moral
judgements, F(1,11) = 1.25, ns, and the difference
Table 5 Statistical comparisons on Theory of mind scores
for patients with apathy versus those without apathy
Apathy No apathy Manova statistic
Reality Known Task 9 8
False Belief task
Memory Control 12 11 P > .05
Anti-strategy control 12 12
Filler trials 12 12
Reality Unknown Task Mean Mean
False Belief task 7.56 7.42
Working Memory 10.11 9.83 P > .05
Inhibition Control 12 12
True Belief 10.11 9.83
Fillers 12 11.5
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foreseen harm judgements remained non-significant
F(1,11) = 2.98, ns.
Social awareness test
We took “A” responses on the test to indicate that par-
ticipants judged protagonists’ behaviour as normative,
while “B”, “C”, and “D” responses indicated that partici-
pants judged the behaviour as a social norm violation.
Healthy controls (see Table 3) provided normative data.
Only items on which we obtained more than 95% con-
sensus (p < .05) from healthy controls were used for this
analysis. This consensus was obtained on 12 out of the
23 SAT test items. On these 12 items more than 95% of
the controls identified 5 behaviours as normal, and 7 as
norm violations.
On the basis of our normative data, relatively fewer
patients with apathy (84.6%) correctly identified normal
behaviour compared to those without apathy (91.7%).
Chi-square tests revealed that the percentage of those
who correctly identified normative behaviour differed ac-
cording to the presence of apathy symptoms (χ2 [3] = 200,
p < .001). Based on the odds ratio, patients without apathy
were 2.03 times more likely to correctly judge normal be-
haviour as normal than patients with apathy symptoms.
Also, fewer patients with apathy (Mean = 78%) correctly
identified norm violations compared to those without
apathy (89.3%). Chi-square tests revealed that the per-
centage of those who correctly identified norm violations
differed according to the presence of apathy symptoms
(χ2 (3) = 200, p < .001). Based on the odds ratio, patients
without apathy were 2.28 times more likely to correctly
identify social norm violations compared to patients with
apathy.
When patients who took the SAT test were compared
on executive functioning and depressive symptoms,
there were no significant differences between those with
apathy symptoms and those without apathy on the Brixton
Spatial Anticipation test (apathy patients median = 27;
non-apathy patients median = 21; U = 40.5, ns). There
were also no significant differences in depressive symp-
toms levels on the BDI between patients with apathy
(Median = 17) and those without apathy (Median = 11.5;
U = 52.5, ns). The significant differences in social aware-
ness on the SAT cannot therefore be explained by differ-
ences in executive function or depressive symptoms levels.
Theory of mind tests
We did not include a normal control group for the ToM
tests used in this study because a pilot study on the tests
showed that people without neurological damage per-
formed at ceiling level. See also [74]. We tested the effects
of apathy symptoms on ToM by comparing performance
between patients with and without apathy on the falsebelief score and on control items for working memory, in-
hibition, true belief and the filler scores for both the reality
known and reality unknown tasks.
Reality known test
A one way MANOVA comparing patients with and with-
out apathy on false belief, working memory, anti-strategy,
and filler scores on the Reality known test revealed
non-significant main effects for apathy, Wilk’s λ = .853,
F(4,15) = .646, p > .05 partial eta squared .147. Power to
detect the effect was .166 (see Table 5 for the full results).
Reality unknown test
A one way Manova comparing patients with and without
apathy on false belief, working memory, inhibition, true
belief (comprehension) and filler scores of the Reality
unknown test revealed non-significant effects for apathy,
Wilk’s λ = .969, (4, 16) = .128, p > .05 partial eta squared
.031. Power to detect the effect was .07 (see Table 5 for
the full results).
Emotion Perception tests
Ekman 60 test
Kruskal-Wallis tests comparing the total number of cor-
rectly identified facial expressions of emotions across the
three participant groups showed a significant effect of
participant group on emotion recognition H(2) = 34.82,
p < 0.001. Mann–Whitney post hoc tests with a Bonferroni
correction of 0.0167 significance level showed that the
healthy controls (Mdn = 51) correctly recognised more
facial expressions of emotions compared to both patients
with apathy (Mdn = 41; U = 52.5, p < 0.001, r = −.71) and
those without apathy (Mdn = 51; U = 51.5, p < 0.001,
r = −.61). The difference between scores for patients with
apathy and those without apathy was not significant (U =
140.5, ns, r = −.04). Comparisons on each individual emo-
tion across the three groups also yielded the same pattern
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these multiple comparisons across individual emotion cat-
egories, a Bonferroni correction was applied (see Table 6
for the full results).
Emotion hexagon test
Kruskal Wallis tests showed an overall reliable difference
between the three groups of participants in their ability
to recognise emotions, H (2) = 26.11, p < 0.001. Post Hoc
Mann Whitney tests showed that healthy control partici-
pants (Mdn = 110) recognised significantly more expres-
sions compared to both patients with apathy (Mdn = 87;
U = 45, p < 0.01, r = −.71) and without (Mdn = 75; U = 57.5,
p < 0.01, r = −.54). There were no significant differences
between patients with apathy and those without apathy
(U = 127, ns, r = −.02). Table 6 shows the full results across
individual emotion categories. To address possible power
slippages due to multiple test comparisons, a Bonferroni
correction was applied.
Discussion
Overview
Our results provide new evidence that apathy symptoms
in patients with acquired brain damage are associated with
making impaired social judgements. For instance, patients
with apathy tended to judge that intentionally harming
one person (intended harm) in order to save many more
(as in pushing a bulky man onto a runaway trolley in order
to stop it from hitting 5 others) was morally permissible,
while patients without apathy and healthy controls both
tended to judge such means-to-an-end intentional harm
as not permissible. On the other hand, where harm to one
person was not directly intended, but a foreseeable side
effect of diverting the harm from five people (foreseen
harm), moral judgements for both patients with apathy
and those without apathy were not significantly different.
Furthermore, patients with apathy failed to recognise as
many instances of norm violations as patients without ap-
athy on the SAT, while also misjudging more normal be-
haviours as norm violations. The majority of our patients
with apathy symptoms also had frontal lesions, confirming
findings from other studies on the association between
frontal damage and both socio-cognitive deficits and ap-
athy symptoms (see discussion below). Performance scores
on social cognition measures for emotion perception
(Ekman 60 and Emotion hexagon tests), and ToM failed
to separate patients with apathy from those without ap-
athy symptoms, though the patients with apathy tended to
perform worse. In these cases, the patients as a whole
were reliably worse than controls.
Apathy and moral reasoning
The current data on our Moral sense test that highlights
changes in moral reasoning in patients with apathy maybe accounted for in a variety of ways. For example, recent
research suggests a crucial role of emotional influences
on moral reasoning. It has been demonstrated that in
moral dilemmas where harm is both intentional and dir-
ect, an emotionally aversive reaction is generated that
makes people disapprove of the act [64,78]. Valdesolo
and DeSteno [64] further found that inducing positive
emotions (to counteract the aversive emotional responses
involved in intentional harm dilemmas) made normal par-
ticipants more likely to approve the harm. More evidence
for the role of emotional processes in social behaviour has
been documented by Bechara et al. [56], who demon-
strated that patients with prefrontal damage my fail to
generate emotion signals that help bias behaviour towards
adaptive social acts. See also [61,79]. The responses of
the patients with apathy here then may reflect a lack of
emotional engagement. The most salient feature of ap-
athy involves attenuated emotional behaviour [17].
In support of the above suggestions, Mendez, Anderson,
and Shapira [80] found that emotionally blunted patients
with frontotemporal dementia were also disproportion-
ately more likely to give utilitarian responses in response
to moral dilemmas similar to those used in this study. It
should also be noted that damage to brain areas thought
to subserve this emotional input, such as the anterior cin-
gulate cortex and the ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex
(VMPC) [81,82] have also been consistently associated
with the presence of apathy [2,83,84]. Our current results
are consistent with this explanation since the majority of
those patients who had apathy symptoms and also malper-
formed on the moral sense test (57.1%) had bilateral pre-
frontal lesions. In this context, the evidence suggests that
an underlying affective processing deficit might underlie
apathy symptoms. Also in support of this position, Levy
and Dubois [21] argue that lesions to the orbital-medial
prefrontal regions can disrupt affective processing of the
emotional signals that are responsible not only for direct-
ing ongoing or forthcoming behavior, but that also play a
role in decoding the context and motivational value of be-
havioural events. Such disruptions then make it difficult
for patients to elaborate or formulate action plans, leading
to apathetic behaviour.
Our study is however limited in the extent to which it
can attribute poor performance on the moral dilemmas
to emotional deficits such as those proposed by Damasio
et al. [82] since measures of emotional responding were
not concurrently taken. It is also important to note
that other researchers working with different clinical
samples have explained the type of moral reasoning
deficits found in our patients in terms of impaired
theory of mind processing for moral judgements [85].
However ToM performance did not distinguish patients
with apathy from those without apathy in this study
(see below).
Table 6 Statistical comparisons between patients with
apathy, patients without apathy, and normal controls on
tests for the perception of facial expressions of emotion
Emotion Kruskal-Walis
test result
Post hoc comparisons
Bonferroni
correction = 0.0167
EKMAN 60 H(2) = 34.82,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 52.5, p < 0.001,
r = −.71*
C vs NA U = 51.5, p < 0.001,
r = −.61*
A vs NA U = 140.5, ns, r =
−.04
Anger H(2) = 17.95,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 165, p < 0.001,
r = −.46*
C vs NA U = 84, p < 0.001,
r = −.51*
A vs NA U = 134, ns, r = −.08
Disgust H(2) = 22.71,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 127.5, p < 0.001,
r = −.55*
C vs NA U = 78.5, p < 0.001,
r = − .51*
A vs NA U = 125.5, ns,
r = −.12
Fear H(2) = 16.78,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 143.5, p < 0.001,
r = −.5*
C vs NA U = 170, p < 0.01,
r = −.46*
A vs NA U = 126, ns, r = −.12
Happiness H(2) = 9.21,
p < 0.05
C vs A U = 289, p < 0.01,
r = −.35*
C vs NA U = 170, p < 0.01,
r = −.46*
A vs NA U = 136, ns, r = −.09
Sadness H(2) = 15,47,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 213, p = 0.01,
r = −.35*
C vs NA U = 87.5, p < 0.001,
r = −.51*
A vs NA U = 92.5, ns, r = .32
Surprise H(2) = 9.27,
p < 0.01.
C vs A U = 208.5, p < 0.01,
r = −.35*
C vs NA U = 137, p < 0.01,
r = −.34*
A vs NA U = 146, ns, r =
−.001
EMOTION
HEXAGON
H(2) = 26.11,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 45, p < 0.01,
r = −.71*
C vs NA U = 57.5, p < 0.01,
r = −.54*
A vs NA U = 127, ns, r = −.02
Anger H(2) = 26.11, p <
0.001
C vs A U = 97, p < 0.01,
r = −.55*
C vs NA U = 71, p < 0.01,
r = −.48*
A vs NA U = 130, ns, r = 0
Table 6 Statistical comparisons between patients with
apathy, patients without apathy, and normal controls on
tests for the perception of facial expressions of emotion
(Continued)
Disgust H(2) = 8.22,
p < 0.05
C vs A U = 116, ns, r = −.09
C vs NA U = 92.5, p = 0.015,
r = − .39*
A vs NA U = 116, ns, r = −.09
Fear H(2) = 23.06,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 67, p < 0.01,
r = −.64*
C vs NA U = 59.5, p < 0.01,
r = −.53*
A vs NA U = 108, ns, r = −.14
Happiness H(2) = 9.38,
p < 0.01
C vs A U = 160, p < 0.01,
r = −.44*
C vs NA U = 143, ns, r = −.22
A vs NA U = 95, ns, r = −.25
Sadness H(2) = 27.39,
p < 0.001
C vs A U = 72, p < 0.01,
r = −.65*
C vs NA U = 31.5, p < 0.01,
r = −.69*
A vs NA U = 107, ns, r = −.15
Surprise H(2) = 6.69,
p < 0.05
C vs A U = 167, ns, r = −.33
C vs NA U = 107, p < 0.01,
r = −.32*
A vs NA U = 120, ns, r = −.06
A, Patients with Apathy; NA, Patients without Apathy; C, Healthy controls.
*Between groups difference is significant.
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Patients with apathy were also significantly impaired on
the Social awareness test where they were required to
judge a protagonist’s behaviour in a story vignette by
ascertaining whether an individual had violated socio-
conventional norms or whether the behavior was normal.
The relatively poorer performance by these patients on
this test included rating common social behaviours as
‘shocking’ or ‘eccentric’ while unusual or inappropriate
social behaviours were sometimes judged as normal.
Thus the performance of these patients cannot simply
be attributed to a response bias or a lower level of re-
sponse. It is possible that there are emotional contribu-
tions to social behaviour judgements akin to those
linked to moral judgements, but this has not been estab-
lished. In the context of autistic spectrum disorders it
has been argued that impairments on the Social aware-
ness test reflect reduced processing of the social context
of a situation, an inability to take the perspective of the
protagonist in the story, or are a result of a rigid appli-
cation of social rules [73]. We can with some confidence
rule out social perspective-taking (ToM) deficits as critical,
given that the patients with apathy and those without
apathy did not differ in this capacity. Further work is
Njomboro et al. BMC Neurology 2014, 14:18 Page 9 of 11
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dissociation.
Apathy and theory of mind
Our results suggest that deficits in ToM may not be
enough to account for apathy symptoms. Our results on
ToM differ from studies that have reported an association
between ToM deficits and related negative symptom
spectrum disorders which also include apathy symptoms
[43,86]. There could be a number of reasons to explain
the findings. For instance, there is disagreement about
how best to conceptualise ToM processes, ranging from
the critical role of belief reasoning [48] to the recognition
of mental states such as emotions [87]. Consequently,
different sets of ToM tests have been used, sometimes
on different clinical samples. Some of the ToM tests
also fail to control for the influence of other ancillary
processes that are separate to the ToM process but are
recruited during task performance, such as executive
functioning, comprehension, and memory. The tasks
used in this study employed more robust mechanisms
to isolate ToM processes from these potential confound-
ing variables (e.g., the need for a participant to inhibit their
own self-knowledge).
Apathy and emotion perception
Patients with high levels of apathy did not differ from
those without symptoms of apathy. Compared to normal
controls, both patient groups showed significant emotion
recognition deficits. One possible reason for this lack of
differential performance between the two patient groups
could be that the recognition of emotion from facial
expressions is dependent on diverse processes, mediated
by different brain areas. Damage to any of these areas
could produce impairments on emotion recognition
tests, for a variety of reasons. For example, according
to Adolphs [88], the occipitotemporal, orbitofrontal,
and somatosensory cortices, together with the hippocam-
pal formation, hypothalamus, and brainstem all play a
significant role in the processes involved in extracting
and labelling emotion-related information from facial
expressions.
Conclusion
Our study suggests that patients with brain damage and
apathy symptoms can have significant problems knowing
what is or is not appropriate social conduct. The social
impairments shown by these patients may in part reflect
socio-cognitive deficits some of which relate to judging
the appropriateness or inappropriateness of behaviour
in complex interpersonal settings. The deficits are not
linked to depression, impaired executive functions or
ToM deficits in those individuals with apathy, but they
may relate to particular aspects of apathy symptoms likesocial withdrawal, incapacity to show event-appropriate
behavioural and emotional responses, and a failure to
meet social expectations.
This study provides the first attempt to develop a socio-
cognitive phenotype of apathy symptoms. Such a profile
can be of great diagnostic and rehabilitation value [89,90],
and is important in improving our understanding of
the socio-cognitive correlates of apathy.
Strength and weaknesses
One main weakness in this study is the lower patient
numbers on some of the tests, especially the moral sense
test. This might have contributed to inadequate power
since non-significant findings on tests such as the Ekman
test were often in the expected direction. In other words,
there were large differences between healthy controls and
patients without apathy on one side and those with apathy
on the other. Larger sample sizes might probably have
produced more significant results. Future studies may
consider using larger samples of patients and also using
shorter socio-cognitive tests with less language loading.
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